

## Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14

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APPROVED BY:ACDA/IR/RMILLER

DOD/ISA:COLLMICHAEL

C:VLEHOVICH

EUR/RPM:AFLYOD

NSC/MPOWER

JCS/J-5:COLSTEDEHAM

PM/DCA:VBAKER

ACDA/IR:DLINEBAUGH

S/S:SRGAMMON

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P 090109Z APR 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 071208

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: VERIFICATION

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A NATO 1383, B STATE 58831, C NATO 1797

D BONN 5335, E NATO 1832, F VIENNA 2990

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1. FACT THAT SEVERAL NATO ALLIES HAVE REACTED VIGOROUSLY TO FRG REVISED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS REINFORCES OUR AGREEMENT WITH VIEW YOU EXPRESSED PARA 6, REFTEL A, THAT US SHOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE LEAD IN CONFRONTING FRG ON VERIFICATION ISSUES. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS FOR USE IN SPC DEBATE AT YOUR DISCRETION.

2. FOCUS ON PHASE I. WE UNDERSTAND FRG RESERVATIONS ABOUT EXTENDING ANY OVERT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES WHICH CAN BE NEGOTIATED TO A PHASE II MBFR AGREEMENT, THE CONTENT OF WHICH CANNOT BE FORESEEN AT THIS TIME. WE COULD THEREFORE JOIN A CONSENSUS THAT SPC VERIFICATION PAPER RESTRICT ITS FOCUS TO A PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THE ALLIANCE MAY EVENTUALLY WISH TO SEEK FOR A PHASE II AGREEMENT.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POSSIBLE AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE GROUND MANPOWER. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, ABOUT EFFECT THAT RESTRICTING VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TO PHASE I MIGHT HAVE ON POSSIBLE LIMIAION ON OVERALL ALLIED AND PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER NOW UDER DISCUSSION AND NOTE IN PARTICULAR, THAT VERIFICATION ASPECTS ARE ALREADY IN MINDS OF SOME FRG OFFICIALS ( BONN 5336). IN ADDITION TO OTHER FACETS, ALLIES MAY ALSO WISH TO GIVE PROVISIONAL CONSIDERATION TO VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS OF POTENTIAL AGREEMENT NOT TO INCREASE OVERALL GROUND MANPOWER.

4. POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. WHILE THERE MAY BE AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION SYSTEM AND SOME ASPECTS OF POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE ADDED CONFIDENCE WHICH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT HAVE AS THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT HAS SOME FAVORABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT AN OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM COULD BE OF REAL HELP TO THE ALLIANCE IN AUTHENTICATING SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS REQUIRING A RAPID ALLIED RESPONSE.

5. FRG SPECIAL ZONE. ALTHOUGH ANY AGREED PHASE I OVERT  
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INSPECTION MEASURES WOULD ADMITTEDLY IMPACT PRIMARILY UPON FRG TERRITORY IN THE WEST, THE SOVIETS WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN VERIFYING POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS IN BENELUX COUNTRIES. ANY AGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES WOULD THUS NEED TO COVER ENTRIETY OF NGA. WE ALSO NOTE THAT BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS HAVE ALREADY INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT EASTERN INSPECTORS AT THEIR LARGE PORTS. THEREFORE, FRG WOULD NOT CONS-

TITUTE A "SPECIAL ZONE" IN OUR VIEW; RATHER ENTIRE NGA AREA WOULD BE COVERED FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFICATION.

6. INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE. WE SEE DIFFICULTIES IN FRG CINCEPT OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE. IN THE FIRST PLACE, WE MIGHT HAVE TO INDICATE EVIDENCE ON WHICH OUR CHALLENGE WAS BASED AND THAT EVIDENCE COULD BE VERY SENSITIVE. SECONDLY, INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE PLACES BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE AGGRIEVED PARTY RATHER THAN THE SUSPECTED VIOLATER. IN GENERAL, WE THINK SUCH A SYSTEM IS LEAST LIKELY TO SUCCEED WHEN IT WILL BE MOST NEEDED: IF A DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE OCCURRED.

7. CONTINUOUS INSPECTION. OUR VIEW REMAINS THAT NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES COVERING RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS AS WELL AS WITHDRAWALS ARE DESIRABLE ON THEIR OWN MERITS IN AN MBFR PHASE I AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE SHOULD ASK FOR NEGOTIATED MEASURES TO ASSIST IN ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. OUR JUDGMENT REMAINS THAT MOBILE TEAMS WITH RELATIVELY FREE ACCESS TO KEY TRANSPORTATION HUBS CAN BE OF REAL ASSISTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE IN ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH AND HELPING TO DETER VIOLATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT. AS THIS SEEMS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO GERMANS, THE GUIDANCE IN PARA 1 APPLIES AND YOU SHOULD USE IT WITH DISCRETION.

8. VERIFICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. WITH RESPECT TO DUTCH POINT REPORTED PARA 4 OF REFTTEL, WE REMAIN OPPOSED TO PLACING ANY FORMAL NEGOTIATED OBLIGATION ON INSPECTION TEAMS RELATING TO VERIFICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES. IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE TO NEGOTIATE

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ACCESS FOR INSPECTORS (E.G., TO PERIMETERS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS) RATHER THAN ACTIVITIES THEY WOULD HAVE "LEGAL AUTHORITY" TO OBSERVE, SUCH AS STABILIZING MEASURES. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT ATTRIBUTING "LEGAL AUTHORITY" TO VERIFY STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD REQUIRE THAT THIS POINT BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

9. LIAISON OFFICERS. ON THE QUESTION OF LIAISON OFFICERS WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT COMPROMISE OF LEAVING IT TO PACT TO PROPOSE LIAISON OFFICERS WHICH WOULD PUT WEST IN A GOOD POSITION TO DEFINE THEIR FUNCTIONS. FYI THIS IS COMPROMISE DESIGNED TO MEET STRONGLY HELD FRG VIEWS. OUR VIEWS REMAIN THAT ABSENCE OF LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD BE TO NET ADVANTAGE OF NATO-CERTAINLY IN A TECHNICAL SENSE. END FYI.

10. LIMITING ENTRY/EXIT POINTS. YOU SHOULD INFORM FRG  
REP THAT WE HAVE THIS IDEA UNDER STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND  
HAVE AS YET REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT, BEYOND THOSE  
IN US 5 OCTOBER PAPER.

11. FYI WE ARE UNABLE AT THIS TIME TO REPLY TO FRG NTM  
QUESTIONS OR WHETHER US TROOPS MIGHT USE BENELUX ENTRY/  
EXIT POINTS ON A CONTINUAL BASIS. ALL THESE ISSUES UNDER  
STUDY HERE. END FYI. RUSH

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## Message Attributes

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